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TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW IN AN ERA OF GOVERNING 
THROUGH CRIME 
JONATHAN SIMON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: WHERE TO BEGIN 
Where to begin a first-year course on Criminal Law provides a central 
dilemma.  Since Wechsler and Michael’s influential 1940 casebook, most 
casebook authors have placed the subject of punishment early in the book.  
This part generally discusses the four familiar “theories” of punishment—
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution.  Placed early in the 
book, they provide a framework that students and teachers can discuss as they 
proceed through the canonical subjects such as actus reus, mens rea, or 
causation.  For almost any case that is used to illustrate one of these topics, it is 
fair to ask whether the case will offer fertile ground for second guessing the 
choices of the legislature or court as to whether a particular set of events falls 
on one side or the other of the boundaries of criminal liability. 
For example, take Mr. Proctor—whose prosecution for “keeping a place” 
with the intent of running an illegal drinking establishment in Oklahoma under 
a 1913 state law was thrown out by the Criminal Court of Appeals on the 
grounds that it was in excess of the penal law making powers of the 
legislature.1  Proctor had not yet taken possession of any illegal liquor, and 
thus in the view of the court he had yet to accomplish a criminal act. 2  The law 
was an early part of the legal reform wave that brought prohibition to the 
nation as a whole in 1923.  The court had no quarrel with the legislature’s 
power to criminalize the alcohol trade, only with whether Proctor had 
completed a sufficient amount of the criminal act.3  Although the court never 
takes up the question of punishment, its decision can be questioned on whether 
it can be defended in terms of the reasons for punishment.  Is Proctor 
dangerous as the soon-to-be purveyor of an addictive product that the 
legislature has defined as a serious social danger?  Does the Proctor court truly 
believe that there is a meaningful requirement of retribution that has not yet 
 
* Professor of Law/Jurisprudence and Social Policy, UC Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law. 
 1. Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918). 
 2. Id. at 774. 
 3. See id. 
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been earned or is the opinion primarily a Lochner era paean to formalism and 
property rights?4 
This punishment theory can be revisited throughout the course and is 
particularly fitting with the Model Penal Code (“Code”) focus of most 
casebooks.  The Code’s underlying jurisprudence is one acutely sensitive to the 
role of the general part of criminal law as an important regulator of the 
government’s power to punish.  The Code’s authors, especially its general 
reporter Herbert Wechsler, were strong supporters of social defense criminal 
law that recognized the trio of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation (in 
roughly that order) as the appropriate modern grounds for criminal law.  They 
wanted to adjust common law boundary rules in ways that facilitated the 
rational extension of law enforcement and prosecutorial power (which was, 
after all, expected to result in “treatment” for the guilty). 
I have been reluctant to spend too much time in my Criminal Law course 
on the “theories” of punishment for several reasons.  First, for most of the last 
century our laws defining criminal liability, and rules for attributing that 
liability to particular individuals, have been decoupled from the distribution of 
punishment.  For much of the twentieth century, decoupling took the form of 
indeterminate sentencing systems under which those convicted of felonies 
received nominally long sentences, even life, but which were routinely set at 
much lower levels by the actions of administrative bodies known commonly as 
“parole boards.”5  Such administrative discretion has been cut back or 
eliminated in more recent decades.  The discretion has largely been shifted to 
prosecutors who can take advantage of many overlapping offenses and a range 
of new laws enhancing sentences for recidivists and armed criminals.  As 
William Stuntz has argued, the political dynamics created by legislative 
competition for penal severity and the power of prosecutors often makes the 
boundaries drawn by substantive criminal law irrelevant to punishment.6 
This reality can easily be cloaked by the presumption in both common law 
and modern case law that the boundary-setting problems that preoccupy any 
casebook are vitally important for distributing punishment.  The reform of 
criminal law recommended by the Model Penal Code7 was aimed in large part 
at making the grading of punishment consistent with the principle objectives of 
 
 4. “It cannot be true that ‘the keeping of a place’ coupled with the present intent to violate 
the law, constitutes an overt act.”  Id. at 772. 
 5. California’s indeterminate sentencing law was exemplary, giving its “Adult Authority” 
power to set the total prison and parole sentence after as little a six months in prison for crimes 
with nominal life sentences.  See JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL 
CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 123, 123 n.24 (1993). 
 6. William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
534-35 (2001). 
 7. MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES (1985).  The Code 
is given extensive coverage by many, if not most, contemporary Criminal Law casebooks. 
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the Code, especially the deterrence of dangerous behavior and the “treatment” 
of those not deterred.8  The current era of harsh sentencing laws, however, has 
dramatically transformed that grading logic.  Not only is “treatment” no longer 
anything like a presumptive logic of criminal law, the very linkage between 
culpability—whether tweaked toward dangerousness as the Model Penal Code 
does or anchored in retribution—has been loosened.  In an era of “mass 
imprisonment,”9 the individual criminal, whether the subject of deterrence, 
retribution, or treatment, is displaced by an operation that works on the 
population.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I begin my class with Figure 1 above.  This reflects not the logic of 
punishment, but rather its effects.  The dramatic rise in imprisonment recorded 
in that graph contrasts with a relatively gentle fluctuation in the national 
imprisonment rate between the beginning of hard federal data on the subject in 
1925 and the late 1970s.  The data indicates 100 prisoners for every 100,000 
free adult residents of the United States.  While the rate of imprisonment has 
experienced change—the imprisonment rate went as high as 139 during the 
Great Depression and down as low as the 80s during the years of the Vietnam 
War—it began a rise after 1975 that has only leveled off in the past few years. 
The criminal laws being produced by contemporary legislatures and 
Congress are far more populist in their construction.  There is little 
jurisprudential or criminological depth to new penal statutes such as 
California’s “Three Strike” law, upheld by the Supreme Court in 2003.11  Even 
 
 8. MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 13 (2002). 
 9. See generally MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David 
Garland ed., 2001). 
 10. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging 
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992). 
 11. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
Figure 1
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capital crimes are defined with regard to popular fears about things such as 
drive-by shootings, gang activities, or even satanic rituals.  It is not that these 
laws cannot be discussed in terms of deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, 
and retribution, but only that they seem to radically underdetermine these laws 
and the way they operate. 
This leaves somewhat of a hole in the class, but it is a hole I am not sure I 
want to fill.  This hole will not cause harm to students.  The one thing I want to 
avoid is inoculating lawyers, some of who will be legislators, prosecutors, and 
judges, with the conviction that American punishment is under the control of 
law and thus more or less both democratic and rational.12  Instead, the first 
class focuses on the legal and political changes that have brought us to an 
unprecedented level of punishment in America and the collateral consequences 
this penal excess is having on large segments of our society.13 
II.  MENTALITIES, OR HOW WE THINK ABOUT CRIMINAL LAW, HISTORICALLY 
With the Code’s modernizing aspirations now fundamentally sidetracked 
and yet not replaced by any competitor enterprise, I have found it useful to 
make the theme of historical change in criminal law an analytic framework of 
its own.  In place of a jurisprudential analysis of policy choices among penal 
objectives, I have tried to develop a historical reading of the canonical parts of 
the Criminal Law class.  Neither working within the Code, nor with an 
ambition to replace it with a successor approach, I sought to make its rise and 
its decline a kind of plotline for the court. 
As a useful heuristic, crude but no more so than the fourfold division of 
punishment discussed above, I divide the development of Anglo-American 
criminal law into three distinct “mentalities” by which I mean “rationalities” or 
styles of reasoning about criminal law: (1) a common law mentality, which 
emerges during the sixteenth century; (2) a modern law mentality, beginning in 
the first third of the twentieth century; and (3) a post-modern mentality 
emerging in the late twentieth century.  I put no end date because each of them 
continues to a certain extent in the present. 
 
 12. Compare Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628-29 (arguing 
that violence is at the heart of judicial function, but that this places law in control of violence in 
the United States), with  Jonathan Simon, The Vicissitudes of Law’s Violence, in LAW, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 17 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001) (arguing that Cover overestimated 
the control law has over violence). 
 13. See Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population 
Trends, in 26 PRISONS 63 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999). 
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A. Common Law 
Law is prone to using a term in more than one way.  Terms like “due 
process” or “jurisdiction” mean different things in different contexts.  Few 
words are more overused than “common law.”  Sometimes it means the law of 
England and its colonial societies, in contrast with the “civilian” legal systems 
of the European continent.  Sometimes it means law declared by judges, in 
contrast to the “statutory law” created by legislatures.  Still other times it 
means law before the modern era. 
It is in this last sense that I adopt the term to describe the way of reasoning 
about criminal law associated with England and its colonial societies, including 
the United States, that predominated before the twentieth century.  This law 
was sometimes declared by judges, but it also includes rules formally adopted 
by legislatures and even codified.  Most casebooks present an implicitly 
historical framework in the analysis of different topics in the substantive 
criminal law.  The first case or cases will typically present the law as it stood 
before the twentieth century.  Referring to this as common law may invite 
confusion.  I make this implicit historicism explicit, while at the same time 
eliminating the presumptive evolutionism that often goes along with a 
treatment of how modern law progresses beyond the formalism and rigidity of 
common law rules. 
The focus here is less on particular legal rules, and more on how lawyers 
and judges are encouraged to reason about criminal law.  The elements I 
identify with common law can be thought of as master themes that get worked 
and reworked in different ways in different doctrines.  These elements are 
intended to help students identify how different courts’ reasoning about 
Figure 2
Common Law, 1550 ---
• Body
• Moral/Religious
• Objective
• Sovereign
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different problems can nevertheless make common aspects of the facts central 
to their decisions. 
1. The Body 
Michel Foucault famously argued that the rise of the prison represented the 
triumph of a new technology of power in the realm of punishment (on its way 
to a more general societal ubiquity): the disciplines, which made the explicit 
target the mind, soul, or psyche.14  The earlier penal practices that the prison 
displaced—public executions that were sometimes turned into ghastly public 
torture sessions—had in contrast laid a very explicit claim to the body.  The 
common law fascination with the body is quite consistent with this history.  
Common law judges and legislatures addressed their analyses more directly to 
bodies, with physical movements, and with the visible signs that are emitted by 
bodies engaged in criminal behavior.15  The fundamental (now constitutional to 
some degree) requirement of a guilty act before a punishment can be imposed 
is very much a living inheritance from the common law mentality.  There is no 
crime at all unless, in some way, the body gets involved.  Modern law, as we 
shall see, relaxes this in numerous ways.  The Proctor16 decision discussed 
above, quoted Blackstone: 
Indeed, to make a complete crime cognizable by human laws, there must be 
both a will and an act.  For, though, in foro conscientiae, a fixed design or will 
to do an unlawful act is almost as heinous as the commission of it, yet, as no 
temporal tribunal can search the heart, or fathom the intentions of the mind, 
otherwise than as they are demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot 
punish for what it cannot know.  For which reason, in all temporal 
jurisdictions, an overt act, or some open evidence of an intended crime, is 
necessary in order to demonstrate the depravity of the will, before the man is 
liable to punishment.17 
This emphasis on the body, and the physical forces generally, can be traced 
through many criminal law doctrines.  The law of manslaughter requires that a 
killing be “hot blooded.”  This is a metaphor, to be sure, but not merely a 
literary one.18  As a narrative with which judges were assigned to decide who 
should be tried for manslaughter and who for murder, the hot-blooded 
metaphor anchored a whole series of moves that focused analysis on the body 
in space and time.  Thus the “cooling” of the blood was said to follow a peak 
 
 14. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 16 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1977). 
 15. A good example of this is the law of theft, which begins in the early common law period 
criminalizing only those takings of property that involved a forcible dispossession from the 
victim’s possession.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 919-20 (4th ed. 2004). 
 16. Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918). 
 17. Id. at 773. 
 18. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 59 (2001). 
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of provocation, and the passage of time between the provocative act and the 
lethal response served as a primary rationale for judges to cut off consideration 
for those killers the judges wished to expose to the death penalty—the 
mandatory punishment for murder at common law. 
Indeed the common law categories of manslaughter themselves almost all 
require as provocation a physical assault of something closely analogous.  
Common law judges in theory limited the opportunity for the jury to consider 
manslaughter to those cases that fell near enough to certain canonical 
categories of lethal violence.19  The earliest categories involved “physical 
battery” or “mutual combat.”20  Mere insults were generally not recognized as 
sufficient.  The most famous, or infamous category, a killing following the 
discovery of adultery by one’s spouse, required in its purest common law 
forms actual “sight of adultery.”  By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
trend in American courts was toward relaxing this rule.  Nevertheless, the 
common law mentality remained operational as courts sought some indication 
that the provoked killer had experienced a physical discovery of the adultery 
rather than merely learning of it through “hearsay.”  A nineteenth-century 
Texas court allowed a manslaughter instruction when there was no actual 
sighting but the aggrieved husband had discovered strong evidence of the 
adultery in a direct and physical way: 
It is a late hour of the night,—the parties are found in a corn crib some distance 
from the house, lying down in the dark.  They refuse, at first, to answer when 
called; then, when the wife answers, she denies that any one is with her,—
when deceased gets up he clutches the gun,—defendant finds that the one 
whose previous conduct and “carrying on” with his wife has excited his 
suspicions is the one he has thus found in company with his wife.  What would 
any reasonable, sensible man have concluded from these circumstances? 
. . . . 
As to a proper construction of the expression “taken in the act,” we cannot 
believe that the law requires or restricts the right of the husband to the fact that 
he must be an eye-witness to the physical coition of his wife with the other 
party.  As we have seen, adultery can be proven by circumstances, and the 
circumstances in this case were not hearsay so far as this defendant was 
concerned; they transpired in his own presence, sight and hearing.21 
Likewise, the early definitions of the most aggravated killing, murder, 
focused on the physical features of the killing, lying in wait or poisoning, 
which involve more than the causally efficacious purpose to kill.  They 
 
 19. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 384 (3d ed. 1996). 
 20. Id. at 390. 
 21. Price v. State, No. 3581, 1885 WL 6853, at *5-6 (Tex. Ct. App. Jun. 13, 1885). 
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involved the way the killer conducted himself.22  One of the most colorful 
pieces of common law language on the subject of murder frames precisely the 
physicality of the common law mentality: “abandoned and malignant heart” 
killing.23 
There is no clearer example of the bodily nature of common law than the 
treatment common law judges gave to the crime of rape.  The traditional rule 
that the female victim must receive injuries—physical signs on the body itself 
of resistance to violence—speaks a fascination with the body that is almost as 
grotesque as the rituals of the scaffold.24 
2. Religion 
The common law mentality also rests in fundamentally moral or even 
religious terms.  A great deal of the discourse produced by common law judges 
makes a lot more sense if we acknowledge this deeply religious view and 
accept it as part of our reading of their analysis (I’ll get back to the opening we 
may need to make to religion with regard to the post-modern mentality).  
Essential to this religious worldview are the ideas of evil and pollution.  The 
two are actually the same.  “Evil” is the word that believers give to the 
characteristic of a person having a corrupted soul, for example, one in rebellion 
against God.  “Pollution” is a term also used by some of these believers.  It 
also has been adopted by anthropologists to describe the more generic feature 
of cultural belief systems to define certain substances, people, and situations as 
presenting a catastrophic risk to the well being of individuals and the 
community.25 
 
 22. Notice the issue is not, as it is in the contemporary law of capital aggravators, whether 
the killing is especially painful to the victim. 
 23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1999). 
 24. Like much of rape law, the analysis is as concerned with the behavior and motives of the 
victim as with the perpetrator. 
 25. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE 
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 36 (1982). 
Figure 3: Cotton Mather to a condemned Salem “Witch” 
“You are now to 
dy….[because] the Land where 
you now Live, would be 
polluted, if you should be 
spared from Death.” 
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 Analysis that begins with the modern law’s dilemma of choosing between 
utilitarian and rights-based or moral theories of penal justice cannot appreciate 
how nicely the cultural category of evil or pollution brings these things 
together.  The evil person is quintessentially dangerous to both the moral and 
physical well being of the community.  In making the boundary decisions over 
criminal liability and grading, judges and juries must face the hard task of 
deciding whose crime revealed a truly corrupt person as opposed to a soul still 
in a relation, albeit possibly a faltering one, with God.26  Naturally the law 
attempted to help them with formulas of various sorts.  These formulas can be 
read most coherently when recognizing their essentially religious nature. 
The religiousness of common law is hammered home to many Criminal 
Law students in one of the most celebrated cases in the modern criminal law 
canon, the 1884 Queen’s Bench opinion in The Queen v. Dudley and 
Stephens.27  The defendants, young men crewing a yacht to Australia, were 
charged with killing and eating their shipmate Richard Parker after the three, 
and a fourth party, who was not charged, were forced to take refuge in a raft 
after the yacht foundered far out at sea.28  The jury had used a special verdict 
form on which they had indicated that defendants Dudley and Stephens had 
indeed killed Parker but had done so under dire circumstances in which the 
action may have been their only hope for survival.29  The Queen’s Bench 
declined to reverse the decision of the trial judge finding this murder and thus 
rejected the possibility that taking a life could be justified on the necessity of 
saving another or even several others.30  In ruling out any utilitarian debate 
about whether taking the life may have been justified, the opinion directly 
invoked the religious foundations of English common law.  Declining to make 
elaborate arguments for this hard line, the court stated, “[I]t is enough in a 
Christian country to remind ourselves of the Great Example whom we profess 
to follow.”31 
3. Objective 
The concept of objectivity and its opposite, subjectivity, share with 
common law the attribute of being overused in over-inclusive ways.  
Moreover, common law judges themselves did not necessarily thematize the 
property of objectivity itself.  This would come later and was a kind of 
retrospective recognition through the awareness of a modern mentality.  But 
 
 26. This is not a question of salvation.  The Christianity of the common law was open to the 
soul of even the worst criminal being redeemed.  It was that only for some the execution would 
be a necessary, if not sufficient, part of the salvation. 
 27. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
 28. Id. at 273-74. 
 29. See id. at 277. 
 30. See id. at 288. 
 31. Id. at 287. 
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because contemporary criminal lawyers need to think through all three of the 
existing mentalities, it is important to consider this aspect.  A less 
anachronistic way of characterizing this attribute of the common law mentality 
is in terms of its preference for criminalizing action whose wrongness is visible 
and obvious rather than ambiguous and compatible with benign motives. 
Thus the law of attempt, to the extent that the common law recognized it at 
all, required careful parsing of the line between preparation and attempt.  The 
key question is whether the course of conduct has proceeded to the point where 
its moral obnoxiousness or threat has become visible.  In People v. Murray,32 
the Supreme Court of California reversed a conviction for an “attempt to 
contract an incestuous marriage,” because Murray, who apparently intended to 
marry his niece, had not yet secured the presence of a magistrate, although he 
had already sent for one.33 
It shows very clearly the intention of the defendant, but something more than 
mere intention is necessary to constitute the offense charged.  Between 
preparation for the attempt and the attempt itself, there is a wide difference.  
The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures 
necessary for the commission of the offense; the attempt is the direct 
movement toward the commission after the preparations are made.34 
Of course judges were often begging the question when they invoked terms 
like “necessary” or “continuous and natural sequence” in describing the law of 
causation, but they had in mind the necessity of providing a definitive answer 
one way or the other.  This mandate to make law determinate is another 
common law quality that gets thematized in the opinions of the Queen’s Bench 
judges in the 1884 decision of The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens.  The case, 
as noted before, offers a kind of apologia for the common law mentality 
precisely at the historical moment when the modernization of criminal law was 
becoming more powerful.35  The lead opinion cites the great common law 
digester Lord Hale for the proposition that: “if a person, being under necessity 
for want of victuals or clothes, shall upon that account clandestinely and animo 
furandi steal another man’s goods, it is felony, and a crime by the laws of 
England punishable with death.”36 
Thus, there is clearly no need to consider whether starvation could justify 
Dudley and Stephens’ act of maritime cannibalism against their shipmate 
Richard Parker. 
 
 32. 14 Cal. 159 (1859). 
 33. Id. at 159. 
 34. Id. 
 35. For a description of the transformation of penal practices and ideologies in the United 
Kingdom in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth 
century, see DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES 
(1985). 
 36. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. at 283. 
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The opinion then acknowledges that the standard they have imposed on 
Dudley and Stephens is one that they might not be able to live up to 
themselves.  It states: 
We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to 
lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy.  But a man has no right to 
declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it, 
nor allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the 
legal definition of the crime.37 
Nevertheless, it is their duty to hold that the “facts as stated in the verdict are 
no legal justification [for] homicide.”38  The law cannot take its measure from 
human frailty.  It must be anchored in something greater that makes it 
determinate and, in that sense, objective. 
4. Sovereignty 
The common law of England was the law produced by the King’s courts as 
opposed to other manorial or ecclesiastical courts.  The common law mentality 
of criminal law retains this connection to sovereignty in the authority of its 
judges to hand down normative judgments with reference to no authority other 
than common law itself.  This is a notion reflected more in the absence of the 
problem of authority in common law opinions than the presence of arguments 
grounded explicitly in the theory of sovereignty.  Yet it also means that the 
acceptance of common law by American state courts, often restated in statutes, 
embedded a closer link to the King than post-revolutionary American law 
generally acknowledged.  There is little explicit need to invoke empirical 
information about social conditions or even the hypothetical problem of 
reasonableness.  Thus, in the case of The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 
discussed above, the Court readily assumed that Dudley and Stephens were 
both bound by law to a higher duty than the preservation of their own lives.  
The court’s examples of this speak directly to the importance of sovereignty.  
The court stated: 
To preserve one’s life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest 
and the highest duty to sacrifice it.  War is full of duty, in instances in which it 
is a man’s duty not to live, but to die.  The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a 
captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and 
children, as in the noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties impose on men 
the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives 
for others, from which in no country, least of all, it is to be hoped, in England, 
will men ever shrink, as indeed, they have not shrunk.39 
 
 
 37. Id. at 288. 
 38. Id. at 287. 
 39. Id. 
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Another example of this is the exculpating role of good-faith mistakes.  
When a person in good faith is ignorant of the existence of fact, legal 
definition, or rule of law that makes his or her actions liable, the proof 
necessary for the prosecution may be in danger.  In common law decisions, 
only mistakes of fact were exculpating in this way; mistakes of legal definition 
did not count, at least in theory.  A case consistent with this view is a federal 
decision from the nineteenth century, United States v. Learned.40  Learned held 
irrelevant the defendant’s good-faith ignorance that the voucher he had issued 
his employees payable in merchandise out of his store was a “contract” for 
purposes of an internal revenue law and thus subject to a stamp tax.  In the 
view of the court, “[E]very man is presumed to know the law, and that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse, as general propositions, are too well 
established to admit of dispute.”41  The presumptions not discussed by this 
proposition surround in varying degrees of separation the absent King of 
England, whose rule included the interpretive work of common law courts. 
First, the law, whether the law defining what counts as a contract for 
purposes of the revenue laws, or the law defining crimes, is presumed to be 
part of a continuous system ultimately anchored in the revealed truth of 
religion.  Second, this system is determinate and provides determinate answers 
to any legitimate questions put to it.  No one need speculate as to how their 
conduct will be defined for legal purposes.  Finally, law is clearly distinct from 
both nature and society, which follow their own “natural” or “divine” laws.  
The sovereign law may intervene in society, but it does not play any role in 
constituting it. 
 
 40. 26 F. Cas. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1870) (No. 15,580). 
 41. Id. at 895. 
Figure 4. Common Law Mistake 
Doctrine Assumptions
• Criminal law is part of a general system of 
legal rules extending ultimately to divine 
law
• Law is determinate
• Both society and nature exist apart from 
law
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B. Modern Law 
Most casebooks offer a number of opinions exemplifying the common law 
mentality.  These are usually presented as undergoing a pattern of decline as 
courts increasingly relax the harsh assumptions of the common law.  This 
narrative of a clear but harsh common law giving way to a process of 
interpretive relaxation is contrasted with an alternative ideal—one rooted in 
distinctly modern ways of thinking about law and society.  In most American 
Criminal Law casebooks the model of the modern mentality is the Model Penal 
Code of the American Law Institute.  Most books also include leading opinions 
of the California, New York, and other state high courts that exemplify modern 
ways of thinking, but the Model Penal Code is dominant, so much so that it is 
tempting to interpretively misread it as the Modern Penal Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Mind 
Modern criminal law jurisprudence is at pains to deny that pure thought or 
status can be a crime,42 but the very need to clarify that limit is a clue to how 
much modern law makes the mind the measure of all things, at least all things 
criminal.  To be sure, there are reasons for modern law to avoid too close an 
identification with scientific psychology and its popular but risky claims to 
understand the criminal subject.  Throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, criminal lawyers, jurists, and professors worried about the danger that 
the human sciences would displace legal expertise from the center of criminal 
law.43  Instead, modern law has thought to focus attention on the mental life of 
individuals without being too explicit about the nature of that reality.  The 
whole topic of the mental state accompanying bad acts or circumstances is 
present but very low-key in common law reasoning.  While quick to defend the 
 
 42. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 43. See Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An 
Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1923-24 (1995). 
Figure 5: Modern Law, 1900 ---
• Mind
• Analytic/Scientific
• Subjective
• Social
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proposition that some culpable mental state is required, common law cases, 
especially those present in contemporary casebooks,44 tend to treat mental life 
as imminent in the acts and circumstances, rooted in their very moral 
obnoxiousness or evil, rather than something that transcends the act altogether.  
In contrast, the most developed expression of the modern mentality of criminal 
law, the Model Penal Code, takes great pains to create a complex framework 
for defining different levels of culpable mental state in a way that can be read 
consistently across very different acts, circumstances, and result elements.  
There is no simple criminal intention in the Code.  Every separate bit of 
conduct, circumstance, or result that a substantive crime definition includes 
must have its own burden of proof with respect to the subject’s awareness.45 
A powerful example of the hold of the mental over modern law is the 
development of the law of provocation manslaughter.  As we saw above, 
common law courts limited manslaughter to those cases where a killing had 
arisen out of a limited set of circumstances defined in terms of specific acts 
and analyzed in terms of physical metaphors like “heat of passion.”  Modern 
cases shift the focus from the body and specific provocative physical 
circumstances to the mind and the question of whether the killing was caused 
by an emotional disturbance.  The Model Penal Code’s provision is, once 
again, exemplary: 
[A] homicide that would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse.  The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be.46 
2. Analytic-Scientific 
While the common law mentality looked to religion to provide its 
dominant normative criteria, the modern criminal law mentality turns to two 
sometimes divergent sources of meaning, the political process and the human 
sciences, to define the substantive ends that the system should pursue.  The 
association of modernism in criminal law with greater legislative authority 
 
 44. E.g., Regina v. Prince L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154 (1875) (holding that the prosecution was 
required to show the defendant had acted with at least negligence when he accidentally set fire to 
a ship while stealing rum). 
 45. As Markus Dubber notes in his treatise on the Model Penal Code: 
The price of lucidity was complexity, and of the differentiation, confusion.  The common 
law had known two units of analysis: mens rea and actus reus.  The Code recognized 
seven, and that’s not even counting strict (mens-rea-less) liability.  The quartet “purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence” took the place of mens rea, and conduct, 
attendant circumstance, and result, that of actus reus. 
DUBBER, supra note 8, at 51. 
 46. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 7, at § 210.3(1)(b). 
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over criminal law is reflected in the importance given to rules of statutory 
construction aimed at directing interpretation toward the policy ends preferred 
by lawmakers with democratic authority.  Thus the Model Penal Code provides 
a series of explicit analytic rules for deciding what to do when no term 
indicating the level of culpability is present or when an expression of 
culpability in one part of a statute should be applied in other parts of the 
statute.47  Indeed the pursuit of more precise analytic terms is a perennial quest 
in the modern criminal law, and it reflects the imperative of allowing the 
political process to speak. 
In addition to a commitment to political accountability, the modern 
mentality is heavily influenced by the rise of the human sciences in the 
nineteenth century and their promise that institutions of law operate to solve 
social problems.  The goal of modern criminal law in this respect is to prevent 
crime and to do so in ways that take maximum advantage of what can be 
discerned about human nature from the positive sciences of humanity.  For the 
Model Penal Code, the challenge for criminal law is to balance the goal of 
preventing crime through deterrence with the aspiration to treat those who are 
not deterred.  The concept of dangerousness, while rarely mentioned directly, 
suffuses the Model Penal Code and other modernist efforts at reforming 
criminal law.48 
3. Subjective 
The modern law confronts objectivity and subjectivity as a problem for 
itself in a way probably absent from the thinking of common law courts and 
lawyers.  If modern courts are nervous to embrace the often pejorative-
sounding quality of subjective, they also recognize that the centrality of the 
subject is a potential strength in a society where law no longer fits around a 
unified and coherent moral and religious common wealth.  A good example is 
the law of self-defense where modern courts have increasingly looked to the 
individual qualities of a particular defendant, and his or her view of the 
circumstances, in determining whether they were justified in using lethal force.  
In an often-cited opinion expounding on how the law of self-defense applies to 
a woman who had experienced battery in the past from the victim, her 
husband, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held in favor of a “subjective” 
standard for reasonableness, in which: 
the issue is not whether the circumstances attending the accused’s use of force 
would be sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable and prudent person 
the belief that the use of force is necessary to protect himself against 
immediate unlawful harm, but rather whether the circumstances are sufficient 
 
 47. Id. at §§ 2.02(3)-(4). 
 48. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 12. 
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to induce in the accused an honest and reasonable belief that he must use force 
to defend himself against imminent harm.49 
The Code’s provision on provocation manslaughter exemplifies this 
pursuit of a common ground forged in understanding across subjective 
experiences.  Replacing altogether the common law focus on “heat of passion,” 
and thus cooling time, the Code specifically examines the mind of the 
defendant and asks whether the person was under the influence of an “extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation.”50  
The Code explicitly states that “[t]he reasonableness of such explanation or 
excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s 
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”51  
Reasonableness is the name an increasingly modern law will give to the free-
floating standard required for stability in a post-conventional society. 
The same modern mentality has influenced state courts in reconstructing 
manslaughter doctrine, sometimes even in the face of statutes that embody 
common law language.  A strong example, discussed in many casebooks is the 
1976 decision of the California Supreme court in People v. Berry.52  Berry was 
convicted of murdering his wife, Rachel Pessah.  Shortly after the marriage, 
Rachel made a trip to her native land of Israel.  When she returned about a 
month and a half later, she informed Berry that she had fallen in love with 
another man.  Less then two weeks after her return, Rachel was strangled to 
death by Berry in their apartment.  Berry’s defense was that the killing had 
taken place while he was in a state of uncontrollable rage.  Berry blamed this 
rage on the combined effects of Rachel taunting him with her unfaithfulness 
while periodically sexually stimulating him and demanding sexual intimacy.  
In addition to his own testimony, Berry presented the testimony of a 
psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Blinder.  Based on his examination of Berry—Blinder 
never met Rachel—Dr. Blinder testified that Rachel “was a depressed, 
suicidally inclined girl and that this suicidal impulse led her to involve herself 
every more deeply in a dangerous situation with [Berry].”53  The trial court 
permitted the testimony, but refused to instruct the jury that they could find 
Berry guilty of manslaughter.  Berry was convicted of murder.  He appealed, 
claiming that the judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter, 
defined by California statute as “the unlawful killing of a human being, 
without malice . . . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”54 
 
 49. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 817 (N.D. 1983) (emphasis added). 
 50. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 7, at § 210.3(1)(b). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976). 
 53. Id. at 780. 
 54. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1999)). 
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The Attorney General, defending the trial court verdict, argued that 
because Berry waited in their apartment for almost a whole day before 
confronting and killing the victim, he could not have been under a heat of 
passion.  By any traditional notion of “cooling,” twenty-two hours was just too 
long to stay legally provoked.  The California Supreme Court reversed, relying 
heavily on the testimony of Dr. Blinder.  The Court made clear that an 
individualized and scientifically informed analysis of Berry’s mental state was 
determinative, rather than the amount of time or the bodily metaphors of heat 
and cooling.  The Court wrote: 
[T]he long course of provocatory conduct, which had resulted in intermittent 
outbreaks of rage under specific provocation in the past, reached its final 
culmination  in the apartment when Rachel began screaming.  Both defendant 
and Dr. Blinder testified that defendant killed in a state of uncontrollable rage, 
of passion, and there is ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion 
that this passion was the result of the long course of provocatory conduct by 
Rachel . . . .55 
4. Social 
Without a King to anchor the authority of the criminal law, modern law 
looks to societal norms to determine the standards.  One way of grounding law 
in the social is to allow the jury to bring its own conception of community 
standards to bear.  The trend of modern courts has been to allow questions of 
provocation, self-defense, duress, and others to go to the jury rather than 
deciding them at the judicial level.  In effect, courts no longer operate from a 
sovereign grant of authority but rather as facilitators of society’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55. Id. at 781. 
Figure 6: Modern Law Mistake Doctrine
Assumptions
• Law is fragmented, civil law is quite 
different then criminal law
• Law is indeterminate
• Law plays a role in constituting social 
reality
 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1330 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1313 
Mistake doctrine provides a window into this more social perspective on 
the law.  Modern criminal law tends to recognize both mistakes of fact and 
mistakes of what can be called “non-governing law,” such as legal definitions 
relevant to determining the applicability of specific crimes, as exculpating.  
This recognition that some mistakes of law negate the prosecution’s required 
proof reflects a social conception of law in three respects.  First, law is seen as 
fragmented into distinct specializations rather than as a unified system.  
Second, there is recognition that law is indeterminate and that people can make 
reasonable mistakes about whether they fit a particular legal definition relevant 
to their criminal liability.  Finally, there is a recognition that law helps 
constitute the social world, which is the relevant context for attributing 
criminal liability. 
C. Post Modern Law 
The common law and modern law mentalities more or less represent 
transparent and coherent structures of knowledge and action.  They define the 
ways that criminal courts can know about and act on crime in terms consistent 
with broader understandings.  Most casebooks embrace some version of 
“common law becomes modern law” because it describes the self 
understanding that has, at least until recently, prevailed over the teaching of 
Criminal Law since World War II.  In that sense the framework thus far 
developed is perfectly consistent with the dominant pedagogy which identifies 
a modernizing trend in criminal law and seeks to characterize its dominant 
logics.  Where my framework diverges is in suggesting that criminal lawyers 
ought to think of themselves as operating in what amounts to a post-modern 
mentality.  We can observe that the modern mentality no longer seems to be as 
self-evident or to provide as satisfying an account as it once seems to have, but 
no new understanding has radically reorganized the categories of this way of 
thinking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Post-Modern, 1968 ---
• Cyborg (e.g., carjacking)
• Populist/Risk 
• Situational
• Privatized
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1. Cyborgs 
If the common law focused on the body and the modern law focused on the 
mind, postmodern law is characterized by the emergence of a new target, one 
that fuses the human with the technological.  The political theorist Donna 
Haraway has used the term “cyborg” to describe “a cybernetic organism, a 
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a 
creature of fiction.”56  To some extent this begins under the modern mentality 
of law with the way possession crimes are defined.  As Markus Dubber has 
argued, making possession a crime should raise problems for the act 
requirement because to be in possession of something is less an act than a 
status.57  In recent decades, possession crimes have become more and more 
important sources of criminal liability, playing a major role in the rise of the 
imprisonment rate documented in Figure 1 above. 
A good example of the focus of the post-modern mentality on cyborgs is 
the priority given to prosecuting gun crimes in recent years.  Laws making it a 
crime to be a felon in possession of a firearm apply regardless of the act or 
intentions of the offender, defining the very combination of being a convicted 
felon and having a weapon as criminal threat.58  The target of the law is not the 
behavior of these felons but the very combination of organism and machine.  A 
similar development is the growing number of states that make it an 
aggravating factor, for death penalty purposes, if the killing was done from a 
car or with an automatic weapon.59 
Another powerful example of this post-modern trend is the Federal 
government’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO),60 
which developed the traditional concept of conspiracy law into a much broader 
and more powerful weapon of law enforcement.  The target of RICO 
prosecutions is not individuals’ acts and intentions so much as it is an 
“enterprise” that includes an individual or group of individuals, or formal or 
informal organization.61 
 
 56. DONNA HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 
149 (1991). 
 57. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 40. 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000). 
 59. See Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors 
in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN 
LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 81 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999). 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000). 
 61. Id. § 1961(4). “‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity.”  Id. 
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2. Populist Punitiveness and Risk Management 
Both the common law and modern law mentalities looked outside of law 
for other authoritative forms of knowledge that could shape the rules for 
defining and attributing criminal liability.  The postmodern mentality’s new 
focus is on popular sentiment, particularly the American public’s desire for 
more punitively expressive laws and more protection from criminal risk 
instead of religion or science.  Contemporary laws against sex offenders, 
recidivists, and armed criminals all reflect this logic.62  These laws are populist 
in the language they use that often seems to invoke the “in-your-face” 
confrontationalism of prime-time television.  Terms such as “sexual predator,” 
or “three strikes and you’re out” reflect neither religion, nor science, nor even 
jurisprudence so much as popular culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the poster above shows, this new generation is designed to fit into a world 
of popular commodity advertising. 
3. Situational 
Rather than either the objective world of the common law mentality or the 
pursuit of consensus within the realm of the subjective, postmodern law is 
relentlessly situational, in the sense of pragmatic and flexible, with a focus on 
reducing risk.  RICO again provides a powerful example.  The focus of 
criminal liability here is on “enterprises” and “patterns” of behavior.  What the 
criminal law targets are not morally obnoxious acts or dangerous intentions (or 
proclivities) but rather situations that pose a risk of possible criminal harm.  
This is also reflected in the growing harshness with which the law treats 
reckless and negligent behavior that is correlated with risk, without regard to 
moral obnoxiousness or the dangerousness of the intentions or persons 
involved. 
 
 62. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999) (California’s three strikes law); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (California’s sexually violent predator 
law). 
Figure 8: Poster advertising 
Florida’s 10-20-Life in Spanish
• Use a gun and you’re 
done
• What can we say
about our collective 
conscience from this 
popular new law in 
Florida?
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One of the strongest hints that the modern mentality is losing its purchase 
on the field of criminal law is in the area of provocation manslaughter.  As 
noted above, cases such as People v. Berry63 reflected the power of the modern 
mentality in the readiness of courts to work beyond the common law language 
of statutes.  When I first studied Criminal Law as a student, the then-recently 
decided Berry case was treated by both teacher and students as correctly 
decided and a positive indicator of the influence that modern sciences such as 
psychiatry had on law and on the willingness of courts to open up law to the 
realm of subjective experience.  Today when I teach the Berry case, it feels 
very different to both teacher and students.  We notice how unfair it is that the 
defense expert was allowed to testify to the mental state of a victim he never 
met.  We cringe at the court’s willingness to blame the victim for the violence 
of her husband.  We draw on and discuss recent scholarship suggesting that 
Berry was a serial batterer with a proclivity for escalating violence against 
women he could not control.64  It seems shockingly clear that modern law is, at 
least in this instance, far less protective of women against the well-established 
pattern of male intimate violence than the common law, which allowed male 
rage to mitigate lethal violence only when caused by adultery and only when 
the male had either witnessed it or at least responded the instant he learned of 
it. 
The move toward a post-modern situational justice is suggested by the 
effort of feminist legal scholars to develop an alternative standard for 
provocation manslaughter that would be more protective of women.  A return 
to “objective” common law categories based on the body seems impossible 
(and would hurt many women defendants who tend to reach violence on a 
slower curve then men).  Instead, one leading article has proposed limiting the 
modernist focus on subjective mental state to those circumstances where the 
“emotional judgments are inspired by a belief in a ‘wrong’ that is no different 
from the law’s own . . . .”65  Whatever the merits of this proposal, it 
exemplifies the current tendency to focus on the situation rather than either the 
objective or the subjective. 
4. Privatized 
As suggested above, each mentality of the criminal law reflects an intuitive 
sense of what law is reflecting.  In the common law it is something like the 
sovereign realm that defines what the law relates to and where it draws on for 
 
 63. 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976). 
 64. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 
2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71 (1992); WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE 
GARLAND: A QUESTION OF JUSTICE (1982). 
 65. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1337-38 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
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authority and meaning.  In the modern mentality, it is society to which the law 
looks for its authority and meaning.  Postmodern law is increasingly 
fragmented and privatized.  The interest of the law is not society as a whole, or 
the sovereignty of its rulers, but specific communities defined either by their 
special risks or status.  New laws impose enhanced penalties for selling drugs 
in proximity to schools.  New aggravators in state death penalty statutes make 
capital killings of the very young or very old, of pregnant women, and a 
variety of different kinds of public employees.  Hate crime legislation 
enhances punishment for crimes directed at individuals of a particular group or 
identity.  Along with developments such as “community” policing, this trend 
reflects a retreat from society as law’s interlocutors and towards a variety of 
different kinds of community. 
III.  CONCLUSION: IT’S CULTURE STUPID! 
While it is useful to associate each of these “mentalities” with a particular 
period of relative dominance, it is more accurate to think of them as alternative 
ways of knowing about and acting on the criminal law that are more or less 
available to contemporary lawyers.  At the heart of each of these are different 
pathways by which the cultural knowledge available in historically specific 
social contexts enters into legal judgment.  The study of case law that 
consumes American Criminal Law classes is all about how judges use 
somewhat different techniques to bring facts and law together through the 
manipulation of culture, such as the ensemble of narratives that provide 
categories of meaning available in a particular historically specific society.  
Each of the mentalities I have described represents a shift in the kind of 
narratives which the law draws on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common law, as I have suggested above, draws heavily on religious 
thinking and imagery.  Modern law draws on analytic methods, mainly from 
Figure 9: Dominant Narratives
• Revealed Religious Truth
• Science and Analytic Moral Philosophy
• Multiple
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twentieth century philosophy and science, to provide its categories.  Perhaps 
the most distinctive feature of our post-modern situation is the shear 
multiplicity of narratives available for reasoning about and acting on criminal 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There really is no post-modern mentality yet, in the sense of an emerging 
consensus on how this multiplicity of narratives is relevant to interpreting and 
applying the criminal law.  In a sense I view my course as a practical exercise 
in creating a mentality for the next generation of lawyers.  By helping students 
become aware of the role that historically specific narratives and discourses 
play in making it possible to legally reason about crime, I hope my course 
teaches them to work with the multiple sources of meaning and authority that 
compete in our present age.  Naturally this makes it more difficult to engage in 
the project of reforming the criminal law by identifying its principles and 
seeking to work out implications for various boundary-drawing problems.  But 
we are not in an age when academic legal scholars have much influence on the 
making of criminal law.  Instead we must make our contribution, if any, in the 
preparation of new criminal law mentalities. 
Figure 10: Discourses Infusing 
Contemporary Criminal Law
• Psychologies
• Criminologies
• Feminism
• Conservative Religious Thought
• Liberal Religious Thought
• Civil Rights
• Neo-liberal Economics
• Cognitive Science
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